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In the wake of Shapiro v. Thompson-residence requirements for mi-
grant welfare recipients are unconstitutional-Professor Margaret Rosenheim
wrote, "Shapiro stands as a high-water mark of judicial indignation over a
discrimination which betrays the meanness and inhumanity of public assist-
ance. The traditions of six hundred years have been dealt a mortal blow." 2
Those traditions were rooted in pre-Elizabethan law and custom, in colonial
enactments,3 and at the time of the decision were expressed in the statutes of
forty or more States "Judicial indignation" did not, therefore, represent the
"'moral" sense of the American people on which activists customarily rely for
judicial revision of the Constitution, 5 but rather, as Chief Justice Hughes had
advised a newcomer, Justice Douglas, it constituted an "emotional" reaction
*A.B., University of Cincinnati 1932; J.D., Northwestern University 1935; L.L.M., Harvard University
1938; L.L.D., University of Michigan 1978.
1. 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (Warren, C.J., Black & Harlan, JJ., dissenting).
2. Rosenheim, Shapiro v. Thompson: "The Beggars Are Coming To Town," 1969 SUP. Cr. REV. 303,
345-46. Chief Justice Marshall said with respect to the slave trade that "this Court must not yield to feelings
which might seduce it from the path of duty .... The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 114 (1825). Justice
Holmes wrote that "nothing but confusion of thought can result from assuming that the rights of man in a moral
sense are equally rights in the sense of the Constitution and the law." O.W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 171-72 (1920).
3. The "English Law of Settlement and Removal of 1662... and the earlier Elizabethan Poor Law of
1601 were the models adopted by the American Colonies." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,628 n.7 (1969).
For an instructive panorama of English, colonial and early State laws, with copious citations to the literature,
see Riesenfeld, The Formative Era of American Public Assistance Law, 43 CALIF. L. REV. 175 (1955).
4. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 639-40, 676 n.36 (1969). The Court noted that "[i]n the Congress,
sponsors of federal legislation to eliminate all residence requirements have been consistently opposed by
representatives of state and local welfare agencies who have stressed the fears of the States that elimination of
the requirements would result in a heavy influx of individuals into States providing the most generous benefits."
Id. at 628. Chief Justice Warren alluded to "the apprehensions of many States that an increase in benefits
without minimal residence requirements would result in an inability to provide an adequate welfare sys-
tem...." Id. at 651 (dissenting; Black & Harlan, JJ., concurring). Justice Harlan noted that "a previous
Congress had already enacted a one-year residence requirement with respect to aid for dependent children in the
District of Columbia." Id. at 664. Under its "plenary" power over commerce, Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin,
328 U.S. 408, 425 (1946), Congress should have the last word. Once more the Court rushed in where Congress
had refrained, branding as an "unreasonable burden" on free travel a practice to which the English and
American people had been wedded for 600 years! 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969).
5. For citations to and a critique of such views see Ely, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values,
92 HARV. L. REV. 5 (1978). On the other hand, Justice Holmes stated that "this Court always had disavowed
the right to intrude its judgment upon questions of policy or morals." Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251,280
(1918) (dissenting opinion; Brandeis, Clark & McKenna, JJ., concurring). He was anticipated by Madison:
"[Questions relating to the general welfare being questions of policy and expediency, are unsusceptible of
judicial cognizance and decision." Veto of Internal Improvement Bill (1817), 1 J.D. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 584, 585 (1897).
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for which the "rational part of us supplies the reasons for supporting our
predilections." In Douglas' homelier terms, "the 'gut' reaction of a judge at
the level of constitutional adjudication... [was] the main ingredient of his
decision. ' 6 Are the "gut reactions" of the Justices an adequate basis for
setting aside the continuing objections of the American people to contributing
to the immediate support of migrants?
"We do not doubt," said Justice Brennan, "that the one-year waiting
period is well-suited to discourage the influx of poor families in need of
assistance." But the "nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional
concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel
throughout the length and breadth of our land. . . ." Be that assumed, and it
is a manifest non sequitur to insist that a right to travel entitles a migrant to
support at the terminus.8 One recalls Justice Holmes' analogous "[t]he peti-
tioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitu-
tional right to be a policeman, '" 9 an apothegm that is peculiarly relevant
because the "right to travel" was for 600 years limited by a sovereign right to
exclude paupers.'0
6. W. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 1939-1975, at 8 (1981). See note 197 infra. See also Kurland
quotation, note 198 infra.
7. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969).
8. To be sure, the Court does not baldly formulate its conclusions in this manner. It argues that a State
may not "chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them." Id. at
63 1. To penalize is to impose a penalty, and a penalty imposes a "loss or disadvantage." OXFORD UNIVERSAL
DICTIONARY 1462 (3d ed. 1955). Thus the Court tacitly premises that the traveler is entitled to support at his
destination merely because he must be "free to travel." 394. U.S. 618, 629 (1969). To deny this is to impose a
"disadvantage." It is "unreasonable" to brand as an "unreasonable burden" on the right to travel, id., a
practice that has been embodied in law for 600 years. See note 10 infra.
Another branch of Shapiro relies on the equal protection clause: "any classification which serves to
penalize the exercise" of the right to travel is unconstitutional "unless shown to be necessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest." 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (emphasis added). Again this postulates that a
migrant has a right to support because it is given a resident. The equal protection argument is discussed in text
accompanying notes 153-71 infra. Here it may be noted, as Chief Justice Warren pointed out, that many States
were apprehensive "that an increase in benefits without minimal residence requirements would result in an
inability to provide an adequate welfare system." Id. at 651.
Opposing President Reagan's idea of "making welfare a state responsibility," Governor Lee S. Dreyfus of
Wisconsin "'warned that states 'that try to do a betterjob' in their welfare programs would suffer a flood of poor
migrants." N.Y. Times, May 17, 1981, at 32, col. I. The other side of the coin is illuminated by the Puerto Rican
Commissioner's protest that Reagan's proposed cutbacks would "send a wave of up to 500,000 people to the
United States mainland," N.Y. Times, March 12, 1981, at I, col. 5, who would, of course, look to the given
State for support, as when a wave of Cuban refugees recently descended on Florida. Of course, a State may
abandon its welfare system and thus obviate the discriminatory classification, but what is this but coercion to
accept a migrant's "right to support," conjured up by the Court only yesterday.
9. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892).
10. "Ifra thing has been practiced for two hundred years by common consent, it will need a strong case for
the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it...." Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22,31 (1922). "A procedure
customarily employed, long before the Revolution .... and generally adopted by the States ... cannot be
deemed inconsistent with due process of law ...." Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 111 (1921). Schick v.
Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 261-62 (1974): "At the time of the drafting and adoption of our Constitution it was
considered elementary that the prerogative of the English Crown could be exercised upon conditions.... The
history of our executive pardoning power reveals a consistent pattern of adherence to the English common law
practice." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160 (1968): "So-called petty offenses were tried without juries
both in England and in the Colonies and have always been held to be exempt from the otherwise comprehensive
language of the Sixth Amendment's jury trial provisions. There is no substantial evidence that the Framers
intended to depart from this established common-law practice." See also United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169
U.S. 649, 658 (1898). By the Court's own criteria, its overturn of the 600 year old practice in Shapiro is
indefensible.
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A luminous study by a migrant sympathizer, Professor Zechariah Chafee,
asks, "Should a law enacted by a sovereign State [one of forty or more] be
nullified unless it contravenes a specific clause of the Constitution?""
"[T]here is," he states, "a queer uncertainty about what clause in the Consti-
tution establishes this right" to travel. 12 Justice Harlan regarded it as "nebu-
lous" ;13 and the Shapiro majority noted that the "'right finds no explicit
mention in the Constitution,"' but found "no occasion to ascribe the source
of this right to travel interstate to a particular constitutional provision," con-
tent that it "has been firmly established" 4-by the Court, a judicial Cloud
Nine unencumbered by constitutional moorings. Such nebulosity underlines
the admonition in John Adams' 1780 Massachusetts Constitution: "A fre-
quent recurrence to the fundamental principles of the constitution ... [is]
absolutely necessary to preserve the advantages of liberty and to maintain a
free government,"' 5 particularly when the Court, as Justice Harlan charges,
has engaged in "contriving new constitutional principles."'
6
Before searching for the "right to travel" on which Shapiro rests, it will
be inst-uctive to note a few historical aspects of English and colonial treat-
ment of welfare for migrants that represent an "established" qualification of
the right to travel and mirror present-day concerns. To Rosenheim, the
"durational residence requirement" had "seemed to be permanent"; derived
from the Elizabethan Poor Law, it "had been part of the states' poor relief
laws from the beginning." 17 That Poor Law was grounded on three principles:
(1) local responsibility, (2) settlement (domicile) and removal (of migrants),
and (3) primary family responsibility, a trinity which, Professor Stefan
Riesenfeld observed, "influenced colonial development profoundly."' 8 Im-
position of local responsibility resulted in "vigorous attempts to reduce the
relief burden as much as possible," in large part by preventing "strangers"
from adding to the burden of relief.9 For example, in 1629, the Judges of
Assize at Lancaster entered an order reciting that whereas the Manchester
inhabitants
11. Z. CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, at 190 (1956) [hereinafter cited
as CHAFEE].
12. Id. at 188. And he concludes, "Freedom of Movement is a valuable human right, but is it in the
Constitution? Only part way. Freedom to live where one pleases inside the United States is in it somewhere, as
the Supreme Court has established .... Id. at 209. "The 'right to travel' from state to state has been a favorite
of both the Warren and Burger Courts. The Constitution makes no mention of any such right. By now we know
that that cannot be determinative, but we are entitled to some sort of explanation of why the right is appropri-
ately attributable. In recent years the Court has been almost smug in its refusal to provide one." J. ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 177 (1980).
13. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 771 (1966) (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
14. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969) (quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758
(1966)).
15. Article XVIII, I B. POORE, FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS 959
(1878). For similar provisions, see New Hampshire (1784), Article XXXVIII, id. at 1283; North Carolina (1776),
Article XXI, id. at 14 10; Pennsylvania (1776), Article XIV, id. at 1542; Vermont (1777), Article XVI, id. at 1860.
16. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 677 (1969).
17. Rosenheim, Shapiro v. Thompson: "The Beggars Are Coming to Town," 1969 SUP. Cr. REV. 303,304.
18. Riesenfeld, The Formative Era of American Public Assistance Law, 43 CALIF. L. REV. 175, 178 (1955).
19. Id. at 181.
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from time to time have made great provisions for the poor of said town which good
actions and the want of execution of some convenient course to restrain poor
people, that come from several places to inhabit and in short time chargeable unto
the said town, has been such a motive and invitation of strangers that are poor and
weak in estate as the town is at this present so pestered and overburdened as the
native poor is wronged .... 20
Consequently the court restrained "persons from settling in the town without
sufficient security to prevent their becoming public charges."-21
"It was exactly this state of affairs," wrote Riesenfeld, "which the colo-
nists transplanted to the new country.- 22 Thus, a Massachusetts Bay statute
of 1665 provided that "all such persons as shall be brought into any such town
without the consent and allowance of the prudential men, shall not be charge-
able to the town where they dwell, but, if necessity shall require, shall be
relieved and maintained by those that were the cause of their
coming ..... ,2 Similarly, the 1655 New Haven Code "ordered that any per-
son who had lived for a whole year ... in any plantation should be counted
as an inhabitant of that plantation and neither be sent back nor be chargeable
to any other plantation," and that "nobody should be received as a new
settler without consent of the majority of the freemen." 24 There is no need to
recapitulate numerous other examples collated by Riesenfeld; as Jacobus
tenBroek wrote, Riesenfeld showed how the English Poor Law system, "step
by step, settlement by settlement, and colony by colony," became "deeply
imbedded in community life and legal order."25
Very early the constitutional validity of State law reflecting these prac-
tices was recognized by the Court. In New York v. Miln (1837)26 the issue was
whether the commerce power overrode the New York statute. The Court held
that "the object of the legislation was, to prevent New York from being
burdened by an influx of persons brought thither in ships, either from foreign
countries, or from other of the states.... [T]he necessary steps might be
taken ... to prevent them from becoming chargeable as paupers." 27 Alluding
to New York's purpose to "prevent her citizens from being oppressed by the
support of multitudes of poor persons, who come from foreign countries
without possessing the means of supporting themselves," the Court stated
that "[t]here can be no mode in which the power to regulate internal police
could be more appropriately exercised" ;28 and that since the power "undeni-
ably existed at the formation of the Constitution," it "was [not] taken from
20. Id. at 194.
21. Id. at 191.
22. Id. at 198.
23. Id. at 207.
24. Id. at 211.
25. TenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development and Present Status, 16
STAN. L. REV. 257, 291 (1964). In the eighteenth century, Riesenfeld found, "[removal provisions specifically
applying to unsettled paupers became a ubiquitous feature of the poor laws." Riesenfeld, The Formative Era of
American Public Assistance Law, 43 CALIF. L. REV. 175, 224 (1955).
26. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837).
27. Id. at 133.
28. Id. at 141.
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the states" by the commerce power.29 Although Justice Story filed a dissent-
ing opinion, he "admitted" that the States "have a right to pass poor laws,
and laws to prevent the introduction of paupers.... 30 As a participant in
Gibbons v. Ogden,3 who now cited the case for the exclusive commerce
power of Congress,32 Story was eminently qualified to affirm that the said
power left the right to exclude paupers untouched.
These views were reiterated in seriatim opinions in the 1849 Passenger
Cases,33 all being in agreement as to the right to exclude paupers. Justice
Woodbury observed that "[s]uch legislation commenced in Massachusetts
early after our ancestors arrived at Plymouth. It first empowered the removal
of foreign paupers"; and he cited Justice Story's "admission" that States
"have a right.., to prevent the introduction of paupers into the
States .... '34 Justice McLean referred to the "unquestionable power in the
State to protect itself from foreign paupers and other persons who would be a
public charge." 35 Justice Wayne averred that paupers are "not within the
regulating power which the United States have over commerce.
Paupers ... never have been subjects of rightful national inter-
course .... The States may ... prevent them from entering their territories,
may carry them out or drive them off."' 36 Justice Grier stated that "[t]his right
of the States has its foundation in the sacred law of self-defense, which no
power granted to Congress can restrain or annul. It is admitted by
all ... And Chief Justice Taney rejected the notion that a "mass of
pauperism and vice may be poured out upon the shores of a State in opposi-
tion to its laws, and the State authorities are not permitted to resist or prevent
it," for he too regarded it as "a power of self-preservation," that "was never
intended to be surrendered." 38 These principles were reaffirmed in Railroad
Co. v. Husen (1877): 39
29. Id. at 132. The Court cited Federalist No. 45: "Mhe powers reserved to the several states, will extend
to all the objects, which in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties and properties of the people;
and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the state." Id. at 133. Madison stated in Federalist No.
14, the Government's "jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects [e.g., war and treaty making], which
concern all the members of the republic, but which are not to be attained by the separate provisions of any."
THE FEDERALIST No. 14, at 82 (J. Madison) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937) (emphasis added).
30. 36 U.S. (Ii Pet.) 102, 156 (1837).
31. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
32. 36 U.S. (II Pet.) 102, 155 (1837). Story later repeated, "We entertain no doubt whatever that the States,
in virtue of their general police power" may exclude or remove "vagabonds and paupers." Prigg v. Pennsylva-
nia, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 625 (1842).
33. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
34. Id. at 519, 526.
35. Id. at 402.
36. Id. at 426. Wayne likewise stated, "The States have also reserved the police right to turn off from their
territories paupers .. ." Id. at 425.
37. Id. at 457. Justice Catron concurred with Grier. Id. at 464.
38. Id. at 472, 470. Justices Daniels and Nelson concurred with Taney. Id. at 515, 518. Shapiro v.
Thompson quotes from this opinion of Taney:
For all the great purposes for which the Federal Government was formed, we are one people, with one
common country. We are all citizens of the United States; and, as members of the same community,
most have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our
own States.
394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969). But it ignores Taney's qualification which is decisive of the Shapiro issue: the States
reserved the right to exclude migrant paupers.
39. 95 U.S. 465 (1877).
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We admit that the deposit in Congress of the power to regulate foreign commerce
and commerce among the States was not a surrender of that which may properly
be denominated police power .... Under it a State may legislate to ... exclude
from its limits convicts, paupers ... and persons likely to become a public
charge... a right founded as intimated in The Passenger Cases... by Mr. Jus-
tice Greer [sic] [and Chief Justice Taney], in the sacred law of self-defense.
0
A word, too, about what Justice Rutledge reminded us Chief Justice
Marshall declared was "a grant to Congress of plenary and supreme author-
ity" over commerce. 4' By the Act of March 3, 1891, Congress mandated the
exclusion of "paupers or persons likely to become a public charge. ' 42 The
Act was challenged in the Japanese Immigrant Case (1903) 4f as in violation of
a treaty with Japan, which called for "full liberty to enter, travel or
reside ... but not to affect the laws ... with regard to ... police and public
security .... ". , Justice Harlan the elder held that the treaty "expressly ex-
cepts from its operation any ordinance or regulation relating to 'police and
public security.' A statute excluding paupers or persons likely to become a
public charge is manifestly one of police and public security," 45 precisely as
the Court had held with respect to cognate State exclusions.
In sum, the right of a State to exclude paupers in the exercise of its police
power was repeatedly recognized by the Court and was not questioned until
1941 in Edwards v. California.46 There Justice Byrnes, referring to the "con-
tention that the limitation upon State power to interfere with the interstate
transportation of persons is subject to an exception in the case of 'paupers',"
remarked of earlier judicial references to such migrants as a "moral pestil-
ence" that this "language has been casually repeated in numerous later cases
up to the turn of the century," and then he even more casually overruled the
earlier uninterrupted string of cases on the ground that "it will [not] now be
seriously contended that because a person is without employment and with-
out funds he constitutes a 'moral pestilence.' ,,47 Indigence need not be re-
garded as a "moral pestilence" in order to justify the rejection by forty States
of the burden of supporting migrants. Compare Byrnes' indignation with Jus-
tice Story's application in a similar case of long "established" canons of
construction: "[S]uch long acquiescence in it, such contemporaneous con-
struction of it, and such extensive and uniform recognition [and here em-
bodiment in long-standing State law] of it ... would ... entitle the question
40. Id. at 470-71.
41. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 423 (1946). Justice Frankfurter considered that under the
commerce clause jurisdiction, "'judgments denying power to the States are subject to Congressional revision."
A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 30 (1978).
42. Ch. 55 1, § 1, 26 Stat. 1084 (1891) (the exclusion of paupers appears in the current statutes at 8 U.S.C. §
1182 (1976)).
43. 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
44. Id. at 96.
45. Id. at 97. Similar statutes went unquestioned in Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3 (1915), per Justice Holmes.
See also note 4 supra.
46. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
47. Id. at 176-77.
[Vol. 42:853
RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS
to be considered at rest."' 4 This is not to exalt stare decisis-though Justices
Thurgood Marshall and Brennan cried out in 1973 at a fancied departure from
the "well-established principles" of Shapiro v. Thompson (1969) 49-but
rather to ask whether present-day Justices have been given a dazzling revela-
tion that was denied to Justices who were closer in time to the Founders and
whose views reflect the "600 year tradition." Justice Jackson reminded the
Brethren, "We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible
only because we are final." 5
More is involved, however, than unbroken "practice." That long usage
gives meaning to the terms the Framers employed. Such terms, the Court
held, must be interpreted with reference "to British institutions as they were
when the instrument was framed and adopted." 5' Whatever the scope of
"commerce" and "liberty," they cannot comprehend what English and colo-
nial law and practice so plainly excluded. Who would have maintained in 1787
that since "commerce" and "liberty' ' 52 comprehended the "right to travel,"
they included an indigent's right to be supported at his destination? Of those
terms we may say, as did Chief Justice Marshall of "treason," "It is scarcely
conceivable that the term was not employed by the framers of our constitution
in the sense which had been affixed to it by those from whom we borrowed
it."' 53 In fact, the one time the Founders specifically dealt with the right of
"ingress and regress" in the Articles of Confederation, they expressly ex-
cepted "paupers" therefrom,-4 evidencing their respect for colonial and State
exclusion of indigent migrants. To read current judicial "interpretations"
back into the constitutional terms is to transform the meaning they had for the
Founders. 55 A departure from the governing principles of 1787 to "a principle
never before recognized," declared Chief Justice Marshall, "should be ex-
pressed in plain and explicit terms. ' 56 That can hardly be claimed for a right
to support that finds no mention in the constitutional text or its history.
Present-day Justices have not, however, felt constrained by historical
meaning. Dissenting in a death-penalty case, Justice Douglas said, "The
48. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 621 (1842). Justice Catron said in a seriatim opinion in The
License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 607 (1847), that "[ilf ong usage, general acquiescence, and the absence of
complaint can settle the interpretation... then it should be deemed as settled in conformity with the usage by
the courts." For similar expression by Justice Holmes, see note 10 supra, and by Chief Justice White, see text
accompanying note 106 infra. See also Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970).
49. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 455 (1973) (concurring opinion).
50. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (concurring opinion).
51. Er parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108-09 (1925). For example, "the word "jury' and the words 'trial by
jury' were placed in the Constitution... with reference to the meaning affixed to them in the law as it was in
this country and in England at the adoption of that instrument .... Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350
(1898). See also R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 403 (1977).
52. In Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958), the Court held that "[tihe right to travel is a part of the
'liberty' of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment."
53. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 159 (C.C.Va. 1807) (No. 14,693).
54. See text accompanying note 83 infra.
55. See Justice Black quotation at text accompanying note 64 infra.
56. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 165 (C.C.Va. 1807) (No. 14,693). See also Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547 (1967).
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Court has history on its side-but history alone." 7 Justice Brennan even
more flatly stated that history was not binding on the Court. On the other
hand, Chief Justice Taney emphasized that "[i]f in this court we are at liberty
to give old words new meanings when we find them in the Constitution, there
is no power which may not, by this mode of construction, be conferred on the
general government and denied to the States." 59 That is precisely what acti-
vists unabashedly advocate; but let us be clear that it cannot be rooted in
constitutional warrant but rather represents a claim to judicial power to revise
the Constitution? °
Consider how Justice Byrnes, in Edwards v. California,61 the first inter-
state indigent nonresident case, replied to the argument that such State re-
straints enjoy "a firm basis in English and American history": "[Ihe theory
of the Elizabethan poor laws no longer fits the facts" in light of "a growing
recognition that in an industrial society the task of providing assistance to the
needy has ceased to be local in character." 62 That "recognition" had not,
however, prompted the forty States to repeal their residence requirements,
and therefore merely represented the moral sentiments of the Court, but
another example of what Justice Douglas described as "the evolving gloss of
civilized standards which this Court ... has been reading into" the Constitu-
tion.63 In a similar case Justice Black accused the Court of giving a constitu-
57. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 241 (1971) (dissenting opinion). On the other hand, the Court,
per Justice Harlan, held that "it requires a strong showing to upset this settled practice of the Nation on
constitutional grounds." Id. at 203.
58. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 251 (1970) (dissenting and concurring in part): "We could not accept
[Justice Harlan's] thesis even if it were supported by historical evidence far stronger than anything adduced here
today."
59. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 478 (1849).
60. Professor Louis Lusky pays tribute to "the Court's new and grander conception" of its role, its
"assertion of power to revise the Constitution, bypassing the cumbersome amendment procedure prescribed by
article V." Lusky, Book Review, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 403,406,408 (1979). On such reasoning a break-in
through a window may be defended because entry through the barred door was "cumbersome." See also text
accompanying notes 199-200 infra.
61. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
62. Id. at 174-75. Consider the reasoning of Justice Douglas in a similar case: "We agree, of course, with
Mr. Justice Holmes that the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 'does not enact Mr. Herbert
Spencer's Social Statics .... Likewise the Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a
particular era." Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966). Douglas perverted Holmes'
meaning. Holmes objected to reading Spencer's Social Statics into the Constitution. By parity of reasoning,
Douglas should not read his social predilections into the clause. As Justice Harlan observed, the clause does not
"rigidly impose upon America an ideology of unrestrained egalitarianism." Id. at 686 (dissenting opinion). The
framers left us a record of the limited scope they contemplated for equal protection. See text accompanying
notes 160-66 infra.
When, however, a particular ruling displeased him, Douglas denounced it as "such a serious invasion of
state sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment that it is in my view not consistent with our constitutional
federalism." Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 201 (1968) (dissenting opinion). At issue was the application of
the Fair Labor Standards Act to State hospitals and schools, requiring outlays that fell far short of the burdens
imposed by migrant paupers. But then Douglas stated that constitutional decision making is largely determined
by the judges' "gut reactions." See text accompanying note 6 supra.
63. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 241 (1971) (dissenting opinion) (emphasis added). Cf. Justice
Cardozo:
The constitution and statutes and judicial decisions of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts are the
authentic forms through which the sense ofjustice of the People of that Commonwealth expresses itself
in law. We are not to supersede them on the ground that they deny the essentials of a trial because
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tional phrase "a new meaning which it believes represents a bettergovern-
mental policy."64 That policy may be highly desirable and nonetheless consti-
tute an arrant arrogation of power to amend the Constitution. Change is for
the people themselves, through the machinery of article V.'
HI. THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL
Since the Court hung the indigent migrant's constitutional claim to im-
mediate support on the right to travel, it will profit us to retrace the search for
its roots, a search which perplexed Zechariah Chafee, an eminent protagonist
of the right.6 "Although," said Justice Stewart, "there have been recurring
differences in emphasis within the Court as to the source of the constitutional
right of interstate travel, there is no need here to canvass those differences
further. All have agreed that the right exists." 67 The Justices' "recurring
differences," however, render it "uncertain" that it can be located in the
Constitution, where, Justice Harlan properly insisted, it "must be found."68
What is in issue is the constitutional warrant for the Court's overthrow of
centuries-old residence restrictions on migrant welfare, and that cannot be
settled by the Court's self-serving declarations.69
A. The Commerce Clause
The first judicial invocation in the premises of the commerce clause was
that of Justice William Johnson, who held on circuit in 1823 that State seizure
of a British Negro seaman who temporarily entered South Carolina offended
the clause.70 When the clause came before the Supreme Court in 1837, the
Court held that "goods are the subject of commerce, . . . persons are not,"71
a conclusion echoed about 100 years later by Justice Jackson in Edwards v.
California: "[T]he migrations of a human being... do not fit easily into my
notions of what is commerce." 72 So it seemed to the Framers for, as Chafee
opinions may differ as to their policy of fairess. Not all the precepts of conduct precious to the hearts
of many of us are immutable principles of justice....
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934).
64. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 672 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
65. Time and again Justice Black hammered the point home, dismissing "rhapsodical strains, about the
duty of this Court to keep the Constitution in tune with the times. The idea is that the Constitution must be
changed from time to time and that this Court is charged with the duty to make those changes .... The
Constitution makers knew the need for change and provided for it" by the amendment process of Article V.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting opinion).
66. See text accompanying notes 10 & 12 supra; text accompanying note 134 infra.
67. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759 (1966). Shapiro v. Thompson repeats that the right "has been
firmly established." 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969). The fact that the Justices cannot agree on the constitutional source
of the right, note 9 supra. suggests that "firmly established" refers to a judicial construct rather than a
constitutional right.
68. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 763 (1966) (concurring and dissenting in part). Justice Douglas
remarked, "[lit is apparent that this right is not specifically granted by the Constitution." Edwards v. Califor-
nia, 314 U.S. 160, 178 (1941) (concurring opinion).
69. Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 695, 698.
70. Elkinson v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493 (C.C.S.C. 1823) (No. 4,366).
71. New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 136 (1837).
72. 314 U.S. 160, 182 (1941) (concurring opinion). See also id. at 177 (Douglas, J., concurring opinion).
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notes, "[t]hough much was said about barriers at State-lines against goods,
nobody spoke of barriers against persons," 73 presumably because the
Framers justifiably assumed that such barriers had been razed by the "privi-
leges and immunities" clause of article IV.74 The 1837 Miln view, however,
was apparently abandoned by the Court in The Passenger Cases (1849),7 in
which several Justices considered "transportation of passengers [to be] a part
of commerce,"'76 but, as has been noted, all adhered to the traditional excep-
tion for paupers as an exercise of power reserved to the States. The Court
eschewed reliance on the commerce clause in the much-cited Crandall v.
Nevada (1867).7 And as Chafee asked, "[A]re human beings engaged in
commerce when they are not on business trips but traveling from state to state
on pleasure bent or in search of new homes?" 78 But the commerce clause was
again invoked in Henderson v. Mayor of New York (1875). 79
B. The "Privileges and Immunities" of Article IV
Not the least singular aspect of the Court's search for roots is its relative
indifference to the "privileges and immunities" clause of article IV, section 2,
although it most clearly discloses the Founders' commitment to the right of
interstate travel. Paul v. Virginia (1868)80 noted in passing that it gives citizens
of States "the right of free ingress into other States,' 81 as United States v.
Wheeler (1920) again recognized.8 2 Article IV was borrowed from the antece-
dent article IV of the Articles of Confederation. The latter provided that
[tihe better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the
people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these
States, paupers.., excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of
free citizens in the several States; and the people of each State shall have free
ingress and regress to and from any other state .... 83
73. CHAFEE, supra note 11, at 186. On the other hand, Charles Pinckney referred to the commerce clause
as "the measure of regulating trade," 3 M. FARRAND, RECoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
116 (1911); and Madison explained that the clause "grew out of the abuse ofthe power by the importing States in
taxing the non-importing.. . Id. at 478. Professor Ernest Brown noted that the predominant usage of"com-
merce" at the adoption of the Constitution was the "exchange of merchandise." Brown, Book Review, 67
HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1448 (1954).
74. See text accompanying note 83 infra.
75. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
76. Id. at 401. Apparently Justice Wayne was of the same opinion. Id. at 413, 426.
77. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 43 (1867): "[It is not easy to maintain... that [the tax] violates" the commerce
clause. Chief Justice Chase and Justice Clifford, concurring, rested on the clause. For further discussion, see
text accompanying notes 130-40 infra.
78. CHAFEE, supra note II, at 189.
79. 92 U.S. 259, 270 (1875); but the Court did not decide whether the States can "protect themselves
against actual paupers." Id. at 275.
80. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
81. Id. at 180.
82. 254 U.S. 281 (1920), discussed in text accompanying notes 94-96 & 105-08 infra.
83. Id. at 294 (emphasis added).
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Thus "privileges and immunities" were defined to include "ingress" into a
sister State, "paupers excepted."
Article IV, section 2 of the Constitution provided that "[t]he citizens of
each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the
several States." Justice Harlan commented that "'free ingress and regress'
was eliminated ... without discussion" because "it was so obviously an
essential part of our federal structure that it was necessarily subsumed under
more general clauses of the Constitution. '" 84 But where? To my mind, ingress
into a sister State was implicit in "privileges'and immunities." How could a
citizen of one State fully enjoy the privileges of a sister State without entry
therein, particularly since the prime purpose of the antecedent Articles of
Confederation clause was to secure "mutual friendship and intercourse
among the people of the different States in this Union .... ,85 Thirty of the
fifty-five Framers had been members of the Continental Congress that drafted
the Articles of Confederation, 6 and it is not a little remarkable that in both the
Articles and the Constitution "privileges and immunities" was the subject of
the same article, article IV. To borrow from Chief Justice Taney, "[hey
ought not to be supposed to have used familiar words in a new or unusual
sense." 87 To the contrary, the Framers presumably employed the phrase "in
the sense which had been affixed to it by those from whom we borrowed it."
88
Chafee's exegesis of article IV takes a restrictive view: the "trade and
commerce" of the Articles of Confederation, he considers, "can be regarded
as embraced" in the commerce clause, 9 disregarding that "commerce" had
been associated with goods, not people, whereas "privileges and immunities"
had specifically dealt with the "ingress" of people, going beyond "trade and
commerce" to promote "mutual friendship and intercourse" among them.
Chafee himself noted that commerce would not embrace the pleasure trip or
search for a new home9 comprehended by article IV's promotion of mutual
"intercourse and friendship." No adequate explanation has been offered for
abandoning the familiar ingress-egress connotation of privileges and immuni-
ties in favor of transplantation to the "commerce" or "due process" clauses
84. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 764 (1966).
85. United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 294 (1921). Chief Justice White commented on the argument
that since a State may deprive its own citizens of the right of "free ingress thereto and egress therefrom" that
such legislation is "incompatible with its existence as a free government and destructive of the fundamental
rights of its citizens .... " Id. at 299. There is no need for such generalities because article IV of the Articles of
Confederation declared that its purpose was to serve "mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of
the different States" by granting "free ingress and regress to and from any other State" to "the free inhabitants
of each of these States." Id. at 294 (emphasis added). That purpose would be defeated if any State could bar its
own citizens from egress "to any other State."
86. For list of dual members, see R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 127 n.51 (1974).
87. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 477 (1849).
88. See text accompanying note 53 supra. Cf. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 319 (1957), in which
Justice Harlan stated, "[We] should not assume that Congress... used the words 'advocate' and 'teach' in
their ordinary dictionary meanings when they had already been construed as terms of art carrying a special and
limited connotation."
89. CHAFEE, supra note 11, at 185.
90. See text accompanying note 78 supra.
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with which they had not theretofore been associated. Moreover, to locate
"ingress and egress" in the commerce clause would amputate the qualifying
exception for paupers, an unexplained rejection of the centuries-old English
and colonial practice so carefully preserved by the Articles of Confedera-
tion.91 It seems more logical, therefore, to conclude that the Framers left
"ingress" and the qualifying exception for paupers where those Articles had
placed them-in the privileges and immunities clause.9 Throughout, the
Framers sought to pare each phrase of the extensive Constitution to its barest
essentials. Aware that the Continental Congress had defined privileges and
immunities in terms of ingress subject to the exception for paupers, the
Framers might safely rely on the familiar connotation.93 This was taken for
granted by the Supreme Court. In United States v. Wheeler'4 Chief Justice
White repeated the statement in the Slaughter House Cases95 respecting the
article IV provisions of the Articles of Confederation and of the Constitution:
"There can be but little question that the purpose of both these provisions is
the same, and that the privileges and immunities intended are the same in
each."96
Before we leave article IV, it needs to be emphasized that it was framed
in terms of the right the "Citizens of each State" would enjoy. Notwithstand-
ing, the Court has persistently spoken in terms of a right of "citizens of the
United States." Thus, Justice Harlan stated that "[b]ecause of the close
proximity of the right of ingress and regress to the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Articles of Confederation it has long been declared that the right
is a privilege and immunity of national citizenship under the Constitution.97
But the stated object of the Articles of Confederation was to promote "mutual
intercourse among the people of the different states," and it accorded privi-
leges and immunities to the "free inhabitants of each of these States," not to
"citizens of the United States." The latter concept was yet to be born. Before
the Constitution, said Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden,9 the
91. That article IV, § 2 left no room for the claim that ingress was accompanied by a right to "welfare
relief' may be gathered from an early construction by Justice Bushrod Washington on circuit in Corfield v.
Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230): "The oyster beds belonging to a State may be
abundantly sufficient for the use of the citizens of that State, but might be totally exhausted if the legislature
could not.., exclude the citizens of other States from taking them .... Cited in Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S.
239, 249-50 (1898). See also McReady v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 394-95 (1876).
92. Cf. Woodruffv. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123, 136 (1868): "The only allusion to imposts in the Articles
of Confederation is clearly limited to duties on goods imported from foreign States."
93. For example, Madison sought expressly to limit "cases and controversies" "to cases of a Judiciary
Nature," but was turned down, "it being generally supposed that the jurisdiction given was constructively
limited to cases ofa Judiciary nature." 2 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
430 (1911). In the First Congress, Abraham Baldwin, a Framer, commenting on a proposed amendment said that
such minute regulation "would have swelled [the Constitution] to the size of a folio volume." I ANNALS OF
CONG. 581 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1836) (print bearing running title "History of Debates in Congress"). Chief
Justice Taney observed, "[N]o word was unnecessarily used or needlessly added .... Every word appears to
have been weighed with the utmost deliberation, and its force and effect to have been fully understood."
Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 571 (1840).
94. 254 U.S. 281 (1920).
95. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
96. United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 296 (1920).
97. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 764 (1966) (concurring and dissenting in part).
98. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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States "were sovereign, were completely independent, and were connected
with each other only by a league," 99 as the Articles immediately attest. Ar-
ticle II recited, "Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom and independ-
ence"; article III provided, "The said States hereby severally enter into a
firm league of friendship with each other .... "'to
Until the Court struck out on a new path in 1941, it had adhered to the
traditional view, as Justice Douglas acknowledged: "To be sure, there are
expressions in the cases that this right of free movement of persons is an
incident of state citizenship. . . .'"0' Thus, Twining v. United States °2 ex-
plained an early construction of article IV in terms of rights "which belong to
the citizens of States as such and are under the sole care and protection of the
state governments."' 0 3 As late as 1921, Chief Justice White, speaking for a
Court graced by Justices Holmes and Brandeis, noted that article IV of the
Articles of Confederation secured uniformity "not by lodging power in Con-
gress to deal with the subject, but, while reserving in the several States
authority which they had theretofore enjoyed, yet subjecting such authority to
a limitation inhibiting the power from being used to discriminate."' 0 4 He went
on to say that "the text of Article IV, [section] 2 of the Constitution, makes
manifest that it was drawn with reference to the corresponding clause of the
Articles of Confederation and was intended to perpetuate its limita-
tions . .. ,"'0' including, it may be added, the "exception" for "paupers."
The "continued possession by the States of the reserved power to deal with
free residence, ingress and egress . . . " he declared, "has been so conclu-
sively settled as to leave no room for controversy.'"0 6 And he concluded that
the article IV reservation "to the several States" excluded "federal author-
ity" except where invoked "to enforce the limitation,"' 0 7 and dismissed the
view that "the privilege of passing from State to State is an attribute of
national citizenship."" This in a case that held United States citizenship
99. Id. at 187. In later years Madison pointed out that article II "emphatically declares 'that each State
retains its sovereignty freedom & independence and every power &c, which is not expressly delegated to the U.S.
in Congs. assembled." 3 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OFTHE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 522 (1911). See
also R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 103-05 (1974).
100. H. COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY III (7th ed. 1963).
101. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 180 (1941) (concurring opinion).
102. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
103. Id. at 94. Justice Bradley declared in the Slaughter-House Case, 15 F. Cas. 649, 652 (C.C.D. La. 1870)
(No. 8,408), "The 'privileges and immunities' secured by the original constitution, were only such as each State
gave to its own citizens." On a number of occasions, the Court emphasized that article IV did not "profess to
control the power of the state governments over the rights of its own citizens. Its sole purpose was to de-
clare ... that whatever" rights it granted to them, "the same, neither more nor less, shall be the measure of the
rights of citizens of other States .... Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 252 (1898).
104. United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 294 (1920).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 298. White emphasized that but for the prohibition against discrimination, "the entire domain of
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the States ... lay within the constitutional and legislative powers of
the ... States .... and without that of the Federal Government.'" Id. at 298-99.
108. Id. at 299.
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"confers no immunity against being run out of Arizona by a mob"!"° For
Justice Douglas all this was of no moment because "the thrust of the Crandall
[v. Nevada] case is deeper,""' preferring judicial improvisation to constitu-
tional footing.
C. The "Privileges or Immunities" of the Fourteenth Amendment
Before examining Crandall, let us consider Justice Jackson's appeal to
the "privileges or immunities" of the fourteenth amendment: "No State
shall... abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States... .'"" Justice Jackson did not go behind what he termed "these
general and abstract words"" 2 but, he besought the Court to give them "real
meaning," notwithstanding that "[flor nearly three-quarters of a century this
Court rejected every plea to the privileges and immunities clause."" 3 The
words were not, however, "general and abstract" for the Framers. In its
origin the fourteenth amendment was not concerned with migrants, but with
conferring on resident Negroes the rights secured by article IV to migrant
citizens of sister States." 4 The terms "privileges or immunities" were not, of
course, picked out of the air but were plainly borrowed from the article IV
phrase. In its inception, the Civil Rights Bill of 1866, which was temporally
coterminous with the fourteenth amendment, which the latter was designed to
constitutionalize and place beyond danger of repeal and was in fact regarded
as "identical" with the Bill, '15 banned "discrimination in civil rights or im-
munities," and went on to particularize and identify them: the right to con-
tract, to own property and to have access to the courts." 6 Although the words
"ingress and egress" were not mentioned, employment of the article IV
phrase carried its attributes with it." 7 Aware, moreover, of southern restric-
109. CHAFEE, supra note 11, at 191. In "'any State every citizen of any other State is to have the same
privileges and immunities which the citizens of that State enjoy. The section, in effect, prevents a State from
discriminating against citizens of other States in favor of its own." Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 511 (1939).
110. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 180 (1941) (concurring opinion).
11l. Id. at 182. Justice Stewart, on the other hand, considers that "[t]he right to travel from State to State
finds constitutional protection that is quite independent of the Fourteenth Amendment." Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 643 (1969) (concurring opinion). But he does not identify any particular clause as source of the
right. The text of the fourteenth amendment, "'[nio State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States," poses the question whether the federal government
was left free to do so. (Emphasis added.)
112. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 183 (1941) (concurring opinion).
113. Id. at 182, 183. Chafee cautioned that "exclusive reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment leads to the
unbelievable result that the Philadelphia Convention did nothing at all to preserve the vital assurance, in the
Articles of Confederation of'free ingress and regress to and from any other State.'" CHAFEE, supra note 11, at
191-92. In my judgment, the Founders did something by article IV. See text accompanying notes 81-88 supra.
114. For details see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 41-42 (1977).
115. For citations, see id. at 22-23. Justice Bradley held in 1870 that "'the civil rights bill was enacted at the
same session, and but shortly before the presentation of the fourteenth amendment; was reported by the same
committee; ... [it] was in pari materia, and was probably intended to reach the same object... the frst
section of the bill covers the same ground as the fourteenth amendment .... Live Stock Dealers & Butchers'
Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughterhouse Co., 15 F.Cas. 649, 655 (C.C.La. 1870) (No.
8,408).
116. The bill is quoted in R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 24 (1977).
117. For example, the ratifiers of the Constitution were frequently assured that the words "'trial by jury"
embraced all their attributes, such as the right to challenge jurors. Id. at 403. So too, the Court found that "'the
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tions on the mobility of the freedmen," 8 the framers, in the words of Senator
Lyman Trumbull, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee and draftsman
of the Bill, meant to leave them free "to go and come at pleasure,"" 9 thus
reinforcing the implications flowing from use of the article IV phraseology on
which the "civil rights or immunities" of the Bill avowedly was patterned.'
Nowhere in the debates of the 39th Congress is there a reference to the
freedman's right to support. Rather, Thaddeus Stevens, the leader of the
radical Republicans, vainly sought a homestead for the black man, 12 1 repeat-
ing in his valedictory of defeated hopes while urging adoption of the four-
teenth amendment, "Forty acres of land and a hut would be of more value to
him than the immediate right to vote. '" 2 A North that was loath to confiscate
the land of vanquished rebels for distribution to the freedmen was little likely
to welcome support of blacks who migrated to the North. Indeed, the very
possibility of such migration was regarded with dismay.'2 Nothing is gained
by invoking the words "citizen of the United States," for his rights, as
Trumbull explained, were those conferred by the parallel article IV clause. 24
The Court itself said in 1872, comparing article IV and the fourteenth amend-
ment, "There can be but little question that.., the privileges and immunities
intended are the same in each [case]."' Be it assumed that, as Justice
Jackson said, it should be a privilege of United States citizens "to enter any
State of the Union,"'' 26 the 1866 debates furnish no basis for repudiation of the
established States' right to exclude indigent migrants.'2 7 It begs the question
to reiterate that "[t]he constitutional right to travel from one State to
power of inquiry... was regarded and employed as a necessary and appropriate attribute of the power to
legislate" in England, and hence was an attribute of Congress' "legislative functions." McGrain v. Daugherty,
273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927).
118. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866).
119. Id. at475. Explaining the fourteenth amendment to the electorate in Cincinnati, Senator John Sherman
said that "every body... should have the right to go from county to county, and from State to State ......
Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 77 (1949).
120. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 474 (1866).
121. F. BRODIE, THADDEUS STEVENS: SCOURGE OF THE SOUTH 211, 303 (1959).
122. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866).
123. Fear that the emancipated slaves would flock North in droves alarmed the North. R. BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 12 (1977). Senator John Sherman of Ohio said in the Senate, "[W]e do not like
Negroes. We do not disguise our dislike." Woodward, Seeds of Failure in Radical Race Policy, in NEW
FRONTIERS OF THE AMERICAN RECONSTRUCTION 128 (H. Hyman ed. 1966). In an article published in THE
NATION, August 2, 1866, Thomas G. Shearman wrote, "The members from Indiana and Southern Illinois well
knew that their constituents had barely overcome their prejudices sufficiently to tolerate even the residence of
negroes among them, and that any greater liberality would be highly repulsive to them .... Quoted in 6 C.
FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 1283 n.246 (1971).
124. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 474 (1866). In 1871, Senator Trumbull, draftsman of the Civil
Rights Bill, explained that the "privileges or immunities" clause is "a repetition of a provision [article IV] as it
before existed .... The protection which the government affords to American citizens under the Constitution as
it was originally formed is precisely the protection it now affords under the Constitution as it now exists. The
fourteenth amendment has not extended the rights and privileges of citizens one iota." CONG. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess. 576 (1871).
125. Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 75 (1872).
126. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 183 (1941) (concurring opinion).
127. For that we should require, in Justice Miller's words, "language which expresses such a purpose too
clearly to admit of doubt." Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78 (1872).
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another... has been firmly established and repeatedly recognized,"'12 for
the States' right to exclude indigent migrants had been even more "firmly
established and repeatedly recognized, "' 29 and it had the living sanction of the
people as expressed in the legislation of forty or more States.
D. Crandall v. Nevada
Chief reliance is placed by expansionist Justices on Crandall v. Nevada
(1867).' Justice Douglas considers it decided that the right to travel is
"fundamental to the national character of our Federal government"; 131 Jus-
tice Stewart asserts that it "firmly established" the right. 32 It is, however, a
strange case on which to erect the superstructure of no-residence-restrictions-
on-welfare. The case involved a Nevada tax on any person leaving the State
by common carrier. Confessedly it did not rest on the commerce clause as
urged by Chief Justice Chase and Justice Clifford. 3 3 Instead it held that
citizens must have free access to the nation's capital for federal purposes.
Justice Miller, Chafee observed, "found that somewhere between the lines of
the Constitution there was a right of citizens to leave a state in order to go to
the national capital, although there was no evidence in the case that any
stagecoach passenger was bound for Washington."'34 Consequently the fed-
eral access theory represents the veriest dictum, violating the canon re-
emphasized by Justice Brandeis: "The Court will not 'formulate a rule of
constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to
be applied.' " 35 And as Chafee points out, "Justice Miller's fanciful desire to
facilitate trips to Washington would not help a Texan driving to California."
36
Whatever the meaning Crandall holds for present innovative Justices, it
did not in the eyes of the Court contemporary with it repudiate the States'
right to exclude indigent migrants. In 1877 the Court declared in Railroad Co.
v. Husen,'13 7 "We admit that the deposit in Congress of the power to regulate
128. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969) (concurring opinion) (quoting United States v. Guest,
383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966)). Chafee remarks that "[diespite inspiring statements in all the opinions, Edwards v.
California leaves me somewhat troubled." CHAFEE, supra note 11, at 191. Little wonder that he concluded,
"Freedom of movement is a valuable human right, but is it in the Constitution?... [It] is in it somewhere, as
the Supreme Court has established." Id. at 209 (emphasis added). Divided judicial counsels are no substitute for
a constitutional grant.
129. See text accompanying notes 17-44 supra.
130. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
131. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 178 (1941) (concurring opinion).
132. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966).
133. Justice Miller reviewed the prior decisions and said that "in view of the principles on which those
cases were decided" it was "not easy to maintain" that the tax violates the Commerce Clause. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)
35, 43 (1867). For Clifford's insistence (joined by Chief Justice Chase) on the commerce clause, see id. at 49.
Justice Douglas could not "accede to the suggestion.. that the commerce clause is the appropriate
explanation of Crandall v. Nevada." Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 179 (1941) (concurring opinion).
134. CHAFEE, supra note ll,at 189. Justice Douglas commented, "Mhereis notashredofevidenceinthe
record of the Crandall case that the persons there involved were en route on any such mission ...." Edwards
v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 178 (1941) (concurring opinion).
135. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (concurring opinion).
136. CHAFEE, supra note II, at 192.
137. 95 U.S. 465 (1877).
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foreign commerce and commerce among the States was not a surrender of
that which may properly be denominated police power .... Under it a
State... may exclude from its limits convicts, paupers ... and persons
likely to become a public charge." 1 38 And in 1873 the self-same Justice Miller
who wrote the Crandall opinion referred to the recently adopted fourteenth
amendment and said in Bartemeyer v. Iowa 139 that "the most liberal advocate
of the rights conferred by that amendment have contended for nothing more
than that the rights of citizens previously existing, and dependent wholly on
State laws for their recognition, are now placed under the protection of the
Federal government. . . ."'40 There was no "previously existing" right of an
indigent migrant to support in a sister State. It is scarcely conceivable that
what the commerce clause and the amendment did not accomplish was
achieved by Crandall, which had nothing whatsoever to do with the entry of a
migrant. The logical inference is that for the Court Crandall had no relevance
to welfare restrictions, then and thereafter an unchallenged State's right.
E. Due Process of Law
Justice Harlan found more "solid ground" for the right to travel in the
"liberty" of which "the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of
law";41 but Professor Chafee noted the English pre-colonial practice of ex-
cluding migrant paupers, a recognized qualification on "freedom of move-
ment." 42 Then, too, the words "due process of law," as Hamilton explained
on the eve of the Convention, "have a precise technical import, and are
applicable only to the process and proceedings of the courts of justice; they
can never be referred to an act of the legislature.' 43 This was an accurate
summary of the preceding 400 years of English and colonial law.' 44 The iden-
138. Id. at 470-71.
139. 85 U.S. (18 Vall.) 129 (1873).
140. Id. at 133 (emphasis adided).
141. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 770 (1966) (concurring and dissenting in part). See also
CHAFEE. supra note 11, at 192. Injustice to Professor Chafee, he made no comment on the historic content of
due process but urged instead that the several decisions the Court had used to "safeguard" racial rights freely to
choose places of residence "inside a state" be expanded to "assure the right to live in any state one de-
sires .... - Id. at 192.
Justice Jackson remarked that the "Court has not been timorous about giving concrete meaning to such
obscure and vagrant phrases as 'due process." Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 183 (1941) (concurring
opinion). But the obscurity is of the Court's own making. Charles Curtis, an admirer ofjudicial "adaptation" of
the Constitution, wrote that when the Framers put due process into the Constitution, "its meaning was as fixed
and definite as the common law could make a phrase.... It meant a procedural due process ...." C. CURTIS,
REVIEW AND MAJORITY RULE IN SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 170, 177 (E. Cahn ed. 1954). It is the
Court that made due process an obscurantist phrase. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 258-60 (1977).
142. CHAFEE, supra note 11, at 164. "A procedure customarily employed, long before the Revolution
in ... England, and generally adopted by the States ... cannot be deemed inconsistent with due process of
law." Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 111 (1921).
143. 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 35 (H. Syrette & J. Cooke, eds. 1962).
144. Berger, "Law of the Land" Reconsidered, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1979). Justice Story wrote that the
due process clause "in effect affirms the right of trial according to the process and proceedings of the common
law." 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1783 (1833). In the
Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 100 (1903), Justice Harlan referred to "the fundamental principle that
inhere[s] in 'due process of law' as understood at the time of adoption of the Constitution."
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tity of the due process terminology of the fifth amendment with that of the
fourteenth bespeaks an identity of content. 145 My study of the 1866 debates
convinced me that the framers viewed the words in terms of judicial proceed-
ings; 146 Professor John Hart Ely arrived at the same view. 47 The substantive
content given to the words in the 1890s in order to overturn socio-economic
legislation was a feat of the wonder-working Court.48 It has since cried mea
culpa,'149 recalling the "era when the Court thought the Fourteenth Amend-
ment gave it power to strike down state laws 'because they may be unwise,
improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought'.... That
era has long ago passed into history"' 50-regrettably only partly. The Court
has confined its abjuration to "economic" due process; substantive due
process continues to be employed to overturn social legislation,'5 ' though to
differentiate between "liberty and property," equally governed by "due
process," requires a logic that escapes the ordinary mind, and even baffled
the extraordinary mind of Judge Learned Hand.'52 To extract from the ban
against deprivation of "liberty" without due process of law a prohibition of
legislative limitations on a migrant's access to relief is to do violence to the
historical meaning attached to the term due process by both the Founders and
the framers of the fourteenth amendment.
III. "EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS"
In Shapiro v. Thompson, the Court, Justice Harlan considered, "basi-
cally relies upon the equal protection ground." '5 It found that the classifica-
145. James Garfield, a framer of the fourteenth amendment, stated in 1871 that its due process clause "'is
copied from the Fifth Amendment"; he defined it as "an impartial trial according to the laws of the land."
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong.. 1st Sess. App. 153 (1871).
146. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 201-06 (1977).
147. Ely wrote that the debates are "devoid of any reference that gives the provision more than a proce-
dural connotation." J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 15 (1980). Wallace Mendelson stated that due
process meant in the fourteenth amendment what it meant in the fifth, that -'[t]o incorporate the words is to
incorporate their traditional meaning, and no more .. ." namely, "a fair hearing." Mendelson, Book Review, 6
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 437, 453 (1979).
148. Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 415-16 (1978).
149. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 258-59 (1977).
150. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
151. Ely deplores "the unfortunate resurrection" of the doctrine in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the
abortion case. Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 422 (1978). In
the contraceptive case, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965), Justice Douglas stated, "'We do not
sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic
problems ... or social conditions .... This law, however, operates directly on an intimate relation of husband
and wife." As Alpheus Thomas Mason points out, the inarticulate premise is that "the Court does sit as a
super-legislature in safeguarding the penumbral right of privacy." Mason, The Burger Court in Historical
Perspective, 47 N.Y.ST.B.J. 87, 89 (1975).
In one such case Justice Black declared, "By the use of the due process formula the Court does not...
abstain from interfering with congressional policy. It actively enters that field with no standards except its own
conclusion as to what is 'arbitrary' and what is 'rational."' Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 626 (1960)
(dissenting opinion).
152. Judge Learned Hand observed that the current reading of the fifth amendment as imposing "severer
restrictions as to Liberty than Property" is a "strange anomaly." "There is no constitutional basis," he
declared, "for asserting a larger measure of judicial supervision over" liberty than property. L. HAND, THE
BILL OF RIGHTS 50, 51 (1958).
153. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 657 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
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tion between residents and migrants was a violation of the equal protection
clause, that "the purpose of deterring the immigration of indigents cannot
serve as a justification for the classification created by the one-year waiting
period, since that purpose is constitutionally impermissible. '"' 54 It cast the
issue in moral terms: mothers who move into a State to obtain public assist-
ance are not therefore the less deserving. That is not the issue: the issue is
whether taxpayers of that State must be burdened with the cost of supporting
the "deserving" migrant. As this is being written the Bahamas feel threatened
by a flood of Haitian refugees that strain its financial fabric; 55 the deluge in
1980 of 100,000 Cubans has overtaxed the capacity of Miami to care for
them. 56 An exclusory practice, which has the weight of 600 years of English,
colonial, and continued State laws behind it, was too lightly dismissed as
constitutionally "impermissible." Certainly the equal protection clause fur-
nishes no warrant for the view that it repudiated that practice.
Recourse to the equal protection clause is a relatively recent phenome-
non, not long since referred to by Justice Holmes as "the usual last resort of
constitutional arguments." 157 With due process discredited, equal protection
provided an untarnished alternative, "permit[ting] today's Justices," as Pro-
fessor Herbert Packer explained, "under a different label.., to impose their
prejudices in much the same manner as the Four Horsemen once did."'158 But
what did the words mean to the framers who employed them, the test Senator
Charles Sumner, archradical of the 39th Congress, commended to the
framers: "[I]f words are used which seem to have no fixed signification, we
cannot err if we turn to the framers."' 5 9
154. Id. at 631.
155. N.Y. Times. Jan. 23, 1981, at 2. Professor Rosenheim wrote, "Immigration of low-income groups
produces great strains on public education, public housing, law enforcement, and criminal justice." Rosenheim,
Shapiro v. Thompson: "The Beggars Are Coming To Town," 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 303, 335 n.133. One may
conjecture that such strains contributed to the near bankruptcy of some urban centers.
John V. Lindsay, former mayor of New York, writes that the federal government must "relieve states and
local governments of the fiscal burdens that are brought to their doorsteps by the migrating poor.... Urban
areas, which have become the repositories of the poorest of the nation's poor, will never be able to deliver
essential services ... as long as they are oppressed by such Federal mandates as welfare and Medicaid." N.Y.
Times, Feb. 5, 1981, at A23, col. 5. In Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173 (1941), Justice Byrnes noted,
"The State asserts that the huge influx of migrants into California in recent years has resulted in problems of
health, morals, and especially finance, the proportions of which are staggering." His comment was that "we do
not conceive it our function to pass upon 'the wisdom, need or appropriateness' of the legislative efforts of the
States to solve such difficulties." Id. In fact, however, he was overturning a State effort to deal with the problem
because he deemed it "inappropriate," though he sought to clothe his judgment in constitutional terms that
repudiated the Court's own utterances going back 100 years.
156. Puerto Rico's Resident Commissioner predicted in Washington that President Reagan's cutbacks
"would cause a loss of 30,000 jobs [in Puerto Rico], send a wave of up to 500,000 people to the United States
mainland... .- N.Y. Times, March 12, 1981, at 1. Most of the migrants would head for New York and
Massachusetts.
157. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
158. Packer, The Aims of the Criminal Law Revisited: A Plea for a New Look at Substantive Due Process,
44 S.CAL. L. REV. 490, 491-92 (1967).
159. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 677 (1866). Such sentiments were summarized in 1872 by "a
unanimous Senate Judiciary Committee Report, signed by Senators who had voted for the Thirteenth, Four-
teenth, and Fifteenth Amendments in Congress," A. AVINS, THE RECONSTRUCTION DEBATES ii (1967). "In
construing the Constitution we are compelled to give it such interpretation as will secure the result which was
intended ... by those who framed it and the people who adopted it." Id. at 571.
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They began with the Civil Rights Bill of 1866, which proceeded on a
parallel track with the fourteenth amendment in the 39th Congress. It secured
to blacks the same right to contract, to hold property, and to sue as whites
enjoyed. 16 At that time whites enjoyed no right to support by a sister State. In
describing their aims, the framers interchangeably referred to "equality,"
"equality before the law," and "equal protection," but always in the circum-
scribed context of the rights enumerated in the Bill, so that it is reasonable to
infer that the framers regarded the terms as synonymous.1 61 For example, a
leading Radical, Samuel Shellabarger of Ohio, said of the Civil Rights Bill,
"[W]hatever rights as to each of these enumerated civil (not political) matters
the State may confer upon one race.., shall be held by all races in
equality.... It secures... equality of protection in those enumerated civil
rights. ,,62 Attempts to abolish all distinctions repeatedly were re-
jected;' 63 suffrage and segregation were plainly excluded from the scope of the
fourteenth amendment,' 64 because as the chairman of the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction of both Houses, Senator William Fessenden, explained, "We
cannot put into the Constitution, owing to existing prejudices and existing
institutions [e.g., existing exclusion of migrant paupers], an entire exclusion
of all class distinctions." 165 Where terms have been given a meaning in a prior
act (the Civil Rights Act) that is in pari materia, the Supreme Court has held,
that meaning will be given the terms in a later act (the amendment).'6 Bearing
in mind that there was not the slightest intimation in the debates that either
whites or blacks were entitled to support at the end of their travels and that
Stevens' attempt to give the freedmen forty acres in their own States failed, it
is sheer fantasy to read into equal protection a migrant's immediate right to
support in a sister State.
Even within the framework of the Court's own decisions, Shapiro, as
Justice Harlan observed, represented "an expansion of the comparatively
new constitutional doctrine that some state statutes will be deemed to deny
equal protection of the laws unless justified by a 'compelling' governmental
interest, a "doctrine of relatively recent vintage." 67 Prior thereto the rule had
been that there is no denial of equal protection if the statute "is rationally
related to a legitimate governmental objective.""'s Chief Justice Burger com-
mented that "no state law has ever satisfied this seemingly insurmountable
["compelling"] standard,' 69 a twentieth century Procrustean bed. The
160. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866).
161. For citations see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 169-71 (1977).
162. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1293 (1866) (emphasis added).
163. For citations see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 163-64 (1977).
164. Id. at 52-68, 117-33. See also Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment: Light From the Fifteenth, 74 NW.
U.L. REV. 311, 326-31 (1979).
165. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 705 (1866).
166. Reiche v. Smythe, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 162, 165 (1871). See also Taney, C.J., in text accompanying note
87 supra. See also note 88 supra.
167. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 655, 658 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
168. Id. at 658.
169. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
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"compelling state interest" is merely a vehicle for overturning legislation with
which the Justices disagree; it is one of what Justices White and Thurgood
Marshall describe as "a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination
allegedly violative of the Equal Protection Clause."' 70 That "spectrum"
means shifting standards at the service of uncurbed discretion.1
7
'
IV. VOTING AND RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS
"Every breach of the fundamental laws," Hamilton observed, "forms a
precedent for other breaches,"' 72 as the Court demonstrated by quickly ex-
tending the "compelling interest" test to overthrow State restrictions on a
migrant's immediate right to vote. State residence restrictions on voting had
been "well-established." By way of explaining article IV, Blake v. McClung
(1898)'17 stated that a State may "require residence within its limits for a given
time before a citizen of another State who becomes a resident thereof shall
exercise the right of suffrage. ... ,"7' Pope v. Williams (1904)'Ts sustained a
Maryland requirement of one-year residence for the privilege to vote, and
declared that
[t]he privilege to vote in any State is not given by the Federal Constitution, or by
any of its amendments. It is not a privilege springing from citizenship of the United
States.... In other words, the privilege to vote in a State is within the jurisdiction
of the State itself, to be exercised as the State may direct....
absent discrimination in violation of the federal constitution. 176 As late as
1965, Carrington v. Rash'77 cited Pope for the proposition that a State has
"unquestioned power" to impose reasonable residence restrictions on the
right to vote. '78
A new day dawned in Dunn v. Blumstein:179 "Durational residence laws
penalize those persons who have traveled from one place to another," and the
State showed no "compelling reason for imposing durational residence re-
quirements.""'8 Justice Blackmun, on the other hand, contended that
"clearly" the "state does have a profound interest in the purity of the ballot
box and an informed electorate and is entitled to take appropriate steps to
assure those ends."' 6 ' I would not insist that decisions aged in the wood are to
be preferred to those of very recent vintage, but maintain rather that the older
170. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458 (1973) (concurring opinion).
171. See Justice Black quotation at text accompanying note 196 infra.
172. THE FEDERALIST NO. 25, at 158 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
173. 172 U.S. 299 (1898).
174. Id. at 256.
175. 193 U.S. 621 (1904).
176. Id. at 632.
177. 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
178. Id. at 91. See also Drueding v. Devlin, 380 U.S. 125 (1965), affg 234 F. Supp. 721 (D. Md. 1964)
(without opinion); Stares v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), summarily aff'd, 401 U.S. 985 (1971),
cited in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 n.9 (1973).
179. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
180. Id. at 334, 335.
181. Id. at 362 (concurring opinion).
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decisions effectuated the Framers' design, the traditional canon of constitu-
tional construction from which activists now avert their countenances.
To begin with the original Constitution, Justice James Wilson, a leading
architect of the Constitution, said in his 1791 Philadelphia Lectures that ar-
ticle I, section 2 "intrusts to ... the several states, the very important power
of ascertaining the qualifications" of the electors.In He was well aware, for
example, that Connecticut authorized exclusion of freemen "according to the
sentiments which others entertain concerning their conversation and be-
havior... a power of a very extraordinary nature,"' 83 but notwithstanding
bowed to State control. Although the Court based its "one-person-one-vote"
rule on the fourteenth amendment, history, as Justice Harlan justly main-
tained, is "irrefutably" to the contrary,' 84 as a few facts out of many speedily
show. Between 1865 and 1868, "17 or 19" Northern States had rejected
suffrage for blacks. 85 Consequently, Roscoe Conkling, a member of the Joint
Committee on Reconstruction, which drafted the amendment, stated that it
would be "futile to ask three quarters of the States to do ... the very thing
most of them have already refused to do. . . .""6 Another member of the
Committee, Senator Jacob Howard, spoke to the same effect.' 7 Senator
Fessenden, Chairman of the Joint Committee, said of a suffrage proposal that
there is not "the slightest possibility that it will be adopted by the
States .... ,"88 The Report of the Joint Committee doubted that "the States
would consent to surrender a power they had exercised, and to which they
182. 1 JAMES WILSON, WORKS 407 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967).
183. Id. at 409. Although Federalist No. 52 noted that the "definition of the right of suffirage is very justly
regarded as a fundamental article of republican government .... " it concluded that the right must be left to the
States because "the different qualifications in the different States [could not be reduced] to one uniform rule."
THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, at 341-42 (A. Hamilton or J. Madison) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937). And alluding to the
allocation of representatives according to the numbers of inhabitants, Federalist No. 54 added that "the right of
choosing this alloted number in each State is to be exercised by such part of the inhabitants as the State itself
may designate .... In every State, a certain proportion of inhabitants are deprived of this right by the constitu-
tion of the State." THE FEDERALIST NO. 54, at 356 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
184. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgrnent): the reappor-
tionment interpretations were "made in the face of irrefutable and still unanswered history to the contrary."
185. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 256 (1970) (Brennan, White & Marshall, JJ., dissenting in part).
186. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 358 (1866).
187. Id. at 2766. Another member of the Joint Committee, Senator George W. Williams of Oregon, stated:
[Tihe people of these United States are not prepared to surrender to Congress the absolute right to
determine as to the qualifications of voters in the respective States, or to adopt the proposition that all
persons, without distinction of race or color, shall enjoy political rights and privileges equal to those
now possessed by the white people of the country. Sir, some of the States have lately spoken upon that
subject. Wisconsin and Connecticut, northern, loyal, and republican States, have recently declared
that they would not allow the negroes within their own borders political rights; and is it probable that of
the thirty-six States more than six, at the most, would at this time adopt the constitutional amendment
proposed by the gentleman? ... Put it before the country and commit the Union party to it, the
amendment will be defeated and the Union party overwhelmed in its support-and the control of the
government would pass into the hands of men who have more or less sympathized with the rebellion;
and I say that it is of more consequence, in my judgment, that the control of the Government should
remain in the hands of the men who stood up for the Union during the late war than that any
constitutional amendment should be adopted by which the right of suffrage should be extended to any
person or persons not now enjoying it.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. S. App. 95-96 (1866).
188. Id. at 704. For additional citations, see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 58-60 (1977).
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were attached," and therefore thought it best to "leave the whole question
with the people of each State." 89 That such was the vastly preponderant
opinion is confirmed by a remarkable fact: during the pendency of ratification,
radical opposition to readmission of Tennessee because its Constitution ex-
cluded Negro suffrage was voted down in the House by 125 to 12; Senator
Charles Sumner's related proposal was rejected by 34 to 4.' 9 A bevy of
activist commentators concur that suffrage was excluded.' 9' Former Solicitor
General Robert Bork sums up: "Chief Justice Warren's opinions in [the state
reapportionment] cases are remarkable for their inability to muster a single
respectable supporting argument. The principle of one man, one
vote ... runs counter to the text of the fourteenth amendment, the history
surrounding its adoption and ratification and the political practice of Ameri-
cans from colonial times up to the day the Court invented the new
formula."' 92 Warren's "legislators represent people, not trees or acres ' ' 93
substitutes rhetoric for adverse historical fact. By comparison with judicial
arrogation of control over reapportionment, the annulment of State residence
requirements for voting is innocuous. History even more deeply etches the
States' reserved power over suffrage than over exclusion of indigent mi-
grants, so that Dunn v. Blumstein illustrates afresh that power grows by what
it feeds on.
Let me call to witness the whilom idol of the activists, Justice Black. In
overruling Bradlove v. Suttle' 94 (poll taxes are valid), the Court, he stated, did
not proceed from "the original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause" but
gave it "a new meaning which it believes represents a better governmental
policy."' 95 He condemned use of the due process clause as
189. Reprinted in A. AVINS, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS DEBATES 94 (1967).
190. For details see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 56, 59-60, 79 (1977). Little wonder that a
dyed-in-the-wool activist, Justice Thurgood Marshall, asked in a moment of truth: "I would like to know where
the Constitution guarantees ... the right to vote." Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458 (1973) (dissenting
opinion).
191. Lusky, Book Review, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 403, 406 (1979), refers to "Justice Harlan's irrefu-
table and unrefuted demonstration in dissent that the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to protect the
right to vote .. ." See also Abraham, Book Review, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 467, 467-68 (1979); Alfange,
On Judicial Policymaking and Constitutional Change: Another Look at the "Original Intent" Theory of Consti-
tutional Interpretation, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 603, 622 (1978); Mendelson, Book Review, 6 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 437, 452-53 (1979); Nathanson, Book Review, 56 TEX. L. REV. 579, 581 (1978); Perry, Book
Review, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 685, 687 (1978).
Professor Gerald Gunther wrote, "The ultimatejustification for the [Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)]
ruling is hard, if not impossible, to set forth in constitutionally legitimate terms. It rests, rather, on the view that
courts are authorized to step in when injustices exist and other institutions fail to act. That is a dangerous-and I
think illegitimate-prescription for judicial action." Gunther, Some Reflections on the Judicial Role: Distinc-
tions, Roots and Prospects, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 817, 825.
192. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. I, 18 (1971). Ward Elliot
justly stated that in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), the Court fabricated a *'fundamental principle of'one
person, one vote' that was exactly the reverse of the text and stated intent of the equal protection clause." W.
ELLIOT, THE RISE OF A GUARDIAN DEMOCRACY 129 (1974).
193. Reynolds v. Sims. 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964). Justice Harlan justifiably charged in Carrington v. Rash,
380 U.S. 89, 97 (1965) (dissenting opinion), that "the Court totally ignores .. all the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the course of judicial decisions which together plainly show that the Equal Protection Clause
was not intended to touch State electoral matters."
194. 302 U.S. 277 (1937).
195. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 672 (1966).
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though it provided a blank check to alter the meaning of the Constitution as written
so as to add to it substantive constitutional changes which a majority of the Court
at any given time believes are needed to meet present day problems.... If basic
changes as to the respective powers of the State and national governments are
needed, I prefer to let these changes be by amendment as Article V of the Consti-
tution provides. For a majority of this Court to undertake that task, whether
purporting to do so under the Due Process or on the Equal Protection Clause
amounts, in my judgment, to an exercise of power the Constitution makers with
foresight and wisdom refused to give the Judicial Branch of the Government. 196
V. CONCLUSION
The source of the constitutional right to travel has unnecessarily been
wrapped in "uncertainty," for the Founders considered that the "privileges
and immunities" of article IV embraced "ingress and egress," as is indeed
implicit in its text. How else can a citizen of one State enjoy the privileges of a
sister State? But that right was qualified by the States' reserved right to
exclude indigent migrants, a reservation expressly written into the antecedent
"privileges and immunities" of the Articles of Confederation, giving effect to
centuries of English, colonial and State law and custom. If the legislation of
more than forty States may serve as an index, it continued to represent the
will of the American people until it was overthrown by Shapiro v. Thompson.
Be it assumed that it is mean and inhumane, as Professor Rosenheim labelled
it, to condition relief to migrants on one-year residence, the Court is not
empowered to supplant the morality of the people by its own."
Although this is a thrice-told tale, federal Judge Irving R. Kaufman still
incants exploded cliches: "We are not the arbiters of what, in our view,
should be. We are the interpreters of what is .... When faced with a contrary
legal mandate, a judge has no choice but to put aside his personal policy
preferences."' 98 Contemporary academicians are less naive. Professor Robert
196. Id. at 675-76. Similarly, Justice Harlan declared, "When the Court disregards the express intent and
understanding of the Framers, it has invaded the realm of the political process to which the amending power was
committed, and it has violated the constitutional structure which it is its highest duty to protect." Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 203 (1970) (concurring and dissenting in part).
197. Crane Brinton wrote of Robespierre, "If Frenchmen would not be free and virtuous voluntarily then
he would force them to be free and cram virtue down their throats." 2 C. BRINTON, S. CHRISTOPHER & R.
WOLFF, A HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION 115 (1955). W.H. Auden noted that "under the Protectorate, English-
men learned that the dangers of arbitrary power were not necessarily removed simply by the abolition of the
Crown, for the claims of self-appointed saints to know by divine inspiration what the good life should be and to
have the right to impose their notions on the ungodly could be as great a threat as the divine right of kings."
Auden, Introduction to THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF SIDNEY SMITH at xvi (1956).
Presumably awareness of such historical experience inspired Justice Holmes to advise Justice Harlan
Stone: "Young man about 75 years ago I learned that I was not God. And so, when the people... want to do
something I can't find anything in the Constitution expressly forbidding them to do, I say, whether I like it or
not, 'Goddamit, let 'em do it. " C. CURTIS, LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 281 (1947). In stark contrast stands
the eagerness of contemporary activist Justices-our "self-appointed saints"-to "'cram" their moral senti-
ments "down the throats" of the American people. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 328 n.56
(1977).
198. N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1981, at 23, col. 6. For a more realistic appraisal, see the dissent of four of his
brethren in Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 171 (1978) (dissenting opinion by Circuit Judge Van Graafeiland).
Contrast with Judge Kaufman's the following comment on Dunn v. Blumstein by Professor Philip Kurland:
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Cover thrusts aside "the self-evident meaning of the Constitution," let alone
"the intentions of the framers," explaining that the Constitution is of no
moment because "we" have decided to "entrust" judges with forming an
"ideology" whereby legislation may be measured, and it may be added, the
Framers' choices discarded.' 99 Of course, Cover does not tell us where the
people "entrusted" such power to judges; it is simply a grant by academic
illuminati. Professor Paul Brest lets the cat out of the bag, challenging the
"assumption" that "judges and other public officials are bound by the text or
original understanding of the Constitution."-200 Why should the people be
more bound by the Constitution than the judges, who have sworn "to support
this Constitution"?
It is the purpose of this Article, one of a number of other case studies, 20'
to flesh out what Professor Philip Kurland described as "the usurpation by
the judiciary of general governmental powers on the pretext that its authority
derives from the fourteenth amendment.- 20 2 Only when the people under-
stand that it is the Justices, not the Constitution,2 3 that require bussing,
affirmative action and the like will they be moved to reassert their right to
self-government.
The judgment was based on the invocation of two slogans as though they were reasons: "the right to
travel" was one and the "lack of a compelling state interest to overcome a suspect classification" was
the other. A "compelling state interest" like "a suspect classification" and "the right to travel"
remain subjective determinations dependent on the personal proclivities of each of the Justices.
The transmogrification of welfare from a concept of charity to one of constitutional right received
a strong push in Shapiro v. Thompson....
Kurland, 1971 Term: The Year of the Stewart-White Court, 1972 SUP. CT. REV. 181, 206, 255.
199. Cover, Book Review, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 14, 1978, at 26, 27.
200. Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 224 (1980); see
also Forrester, Are We Ready For Truth in Judging?, 63 A.B.A.J. 1212 (1977).
201. Elsewhere I demonstrated that the Court read suffrage and desegregation of schools into the four-
teenth amendment, notwithstanding their having been excluded by the framers, R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY 52-68, 117-133 (1977); that it converted the prohibition of Bills of Attainder-confessedly associated
at the adoption of the Constitution with legislative condemnations to death, Berger, Bills of Attainder: A Study
of Amendment by the Court, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 355 (1978)-to strike down noncapital, even civil, "penal-
ties." Similarly I examined the Court's six-man jury decision which toppled the twelve-man jury "sacred" to
the Founders and considered by them to be a central pillar of their democratic edifice. R. BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 397, 399-400 (1977). Soon, however, the Court decreed that a five-man jury is
unconstitutional, on the ground, three Justices considered, that "a line has to be drawn somewhere." Ballew v.
Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 239, 246 (1978). Why could it not be drawn where the Framers reverently left it? To an
irreverent observer there is a striking similarity to George Orwell's ANIMAL FARM 47 (1946), where the sheep
were taught to bleat: "Four legs good, two legs bad."
202. Letter to Harvard University Press, August 15, 1977. See also Gunther quotation, note 191 supra.
203. At the height of the Court Packing campaign Professor Felix Frankfurter advised President Roosevelt:
People have been taught to believe that when the Supreme Court speaks it is not they who speak but
the Constitution, whereas, of course, in so many vital cases, it is they who speak and not the Constitu-
tion. And I verily believe that that is what the country needs most to understand.
ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE, 1928-1945, at 383 (M. Freedman ed. 1967).
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